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Comment
CONSIDERATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN PROBATE MATTERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession, contrary to the belief of some skeptics, is
generally quite concerned with the rigorous observation of ethical
standards. All too often, however, the ethical standard becomes
hidden in a maze of technical legal problems. Probate, probably
more than any other area of practice, abounds in ethical pitfalls.
Since such a large portion of probate is thought of as nonadversarial,
conflicts of interest often pass unnoticed. Recognizing this recur-
rence of ethical problems, this comment is both a presentation of
some of the more salient problems of professional responsibility
arising in probate matters and a critical analysis of the rules and
practices pertinent to these problems. Specifically, the following
situations will be considered: (1) the drafting attorney named as
executor or as counsel to the executor; (2) the drafting attorney as
witness and counsel in the probate contest; and (3) the drafting
attorney as beneficiary under the will.
II. THE DRAFTING ATTORNEY NAMED AS EXECUTOR
OR AS COUNSEL TO THE EXECUTOR
The general rule regarding the propriety of the scrivener being
named as executor or counsel to the executor in a will is stated
in Ethical Consideration 5-6 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility: "A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name
him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases
where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be
taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety."1
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as
the CODE]. An interesting legal problem may arise where the attorney
is both the named counsel to the executor and attesting witness to the
will ("An attorney may, with propriety, act as an attesting witness to
execution of a will he has drawn, when requested to do so by the
client." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, ABA INF. DEC. No. C738(1963)). In most jurisdictions statutes provide that the witness shall
receive no beneficial interest under the will Such statutes present this
problem: If an attesting attorney is named counsel to the executor, is
he receiving a beneficial interest under the will so as to void his desig-
nation? Courts have answered this in the negative. One line of cases
reasons that the type of interest referred to in the statute must be a
direct, certain, and vested interest. Since the designation of an at-
torney to the executor is an uncertain and remote interest, the fee being
merely compensation for serving the estate, the statute does not apply.
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Generally, the testator's attorney is familiar with the affairs of the
deceased's estate, and it is advantageous that he should serve the
estate in probate.2 However, the manner in which the attorney is
named to represent the estate may raise some definite ethical
problems. One method of naming the attorney which causes some
ethical difficulty is to provide for a corporate executor in the will.
Where a will provides for a corporate executor, the corporate
executor is almost certain to appoint the scrivener to represent the
estate upon the death of the testator. This practice is generally the
result of a "gentleman's agreement" between the scrivener and the
corporate executor, but occasionally it is the product of a written
agreement. For example, a written agreement between the Minne-
sota Hennepin County Bar Association and the banks of Minneapolis
provides:
In all legal matters involved in the administration of estates and
trusts, the trust institution shall employ, or if acting jointly with
co-executor or co-trustee, shall recommend the employment of, the
testator's or donor's or family's lawyer in all instances where such
lawyer is available, unless there are compelling reasons to the con-
trary such as disqualification because of interest or disability. The
trust institution shall not recommend or suggest to its customer that
he forego including in his proposed Will or Trust a recommendation
that the fiduciary employ the customer's lawyer to perform the legal
services arising thereunder.
E.g., Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 87 Idaho 366, 393 P.2d 588 (1964). Another
group of cases holds that the public policy of the rule is to preserve
the competency of the witness, and allowing the attorney to serve as
counsel for the executor does not defeat that purpose. E.g., Rosen-
baum v. Cahn, 234 Ark. 290, 351 S.W.2d 857 (1961). A final line of
authority holds that since the executor is not bound by the designa-
tion, the will has given the attorney no right but is purely advisory.
E.g., Pickett's Will, 49 Ore. 127, 89 P. 377 (1907).
2 To avoid impropriety in this area the scrivener should take several
precautions. First, to prevent any allegation of undue influence, the
suggestion that the scrivener be named executor or counsel in probate
must originate with the testator. In the words of the New York Ethics
Committee: "It is obviously improper for a lawyer. to include such a
provision in the client's will of his own motion, or to suggest to the
client that such a provision be inserted. There is, however, no essen-
tial or inherent impropriety in inserting such a proviso in the ab-
sence of undue influence upon the client." N.Y. CITY Op. 580 (1941).
Second, where the suggested provision is that the scrivener be named
counsel to the executor, the drafting attorney should advise his client
that the provision is not mandatory but functions only as advice to
the executor. Finally, according to the Ethics Committee of the
American- Bar Association, "in cases where the testator desires to
name the lawyer as executor or trustee or to leave him a legacy, the
lawyer should consider having the testator submit the will to another
lawyer prior to its execution." H. DlN=s, LEGAL EmIcs, Appendix G
(1953).
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On its face, this agreement would seem proper because, as
previously pointed out, the drafting attorney is the most likely
candidate for processing the will through probate. The difficulty
with the agreement is that it is an embodiment of what some critics
believe is a conspiracy between the attorney and various commer-
cial institutions to exploit the client. It is charged that corporate
executors and corporate trustees are often designated, not on the
basis of need, but on the basis of a quid pro quo between the
attorney and the banking institution. In exchange for being ap-
pointed corporate executor the bank assures the attorney that he
will be retained when the estate is probated. In addition, many
banks, knowing they are to be named corporate executor or corpo-
rate trustee, have a standing offer to assist the attorney in drafting
his client's will, the bank charging nothing for the service. One
attorney has charged that in such situations it is quite common for
the lawyer to charge a full fee for planning the estate even though
he has done virtually no work.3
Perhaps there is nothing that can be done about the corporate
executor appointing the scrivener as attorney for probate. Besides,
as has been mentioned, there is considerable advantage to such
practice. Nevertheless, it is feasible to circumscribe the will drafting
activities of the banking institutions. If a client requests the con-
struction of some difficult provision in his will, rather then allowing
the attorney to take recourse to a bank, let the unknowledgeable
lawyer suggest a number of "specialist" attorneys capable of
properly drafting the instrument. In that way, the premium on
naming a corporate executor or even recommending the need for
a corporate executor is at a minimum.4
III. THE DRAFTING ATTORNEY AS WITNESS AND
COUNSEL IN THE PROBATE CONTEST
A. INMODUCTION
The Latin maxim, Mandatis cavetur, ut praesides attendant, ne
patroni in causa, cui patrocinium praestiterunt, testimonium dicant,"
a Personal communication with a Minneapolis attorney.
4 One difficulty which might accompany any restriction on banking
activity in this area is that since attorneys will not be able to rely
on the expertise of their bank, they may construct difficult provisions
themselves which do not reflect the testator's intent and which have
great difficulty surviving probate. In other words, by excluding banks
from drafting wills the attorney may not be encouraged to refer the
task to more competent counsel but may, instead, be encouraged to
draft a shoddy instrument himself.
5 Potter v. Inhabitants of Ware, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 519 (1840).
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warned judges not to allow advocates as witnesses in any litigation.
The reason for the prohibition was that Roman law considered
advocates "as not credible, because of the identity of their interest,
opinions, and prejudices with those of their clients."6 However:
This reason, it may be said once and for all, has totally disappeared
from the controversy. It was easy to appreciate its force in the
epoch when pecuniary interest was a disqualification in general; but
with the disappearance of that disqualification has passed away any
inclination to see special danger in the even less tangible interest
of a counsel.7
Today a different rationale supports a similar rule. The general
rule concerning the propriety of an attorney witnessing for his
client is stated in Disciplinary Rule 5-102 (A) of the Code:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending liti-
gation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall
withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not
continue representation in the trial ....8
More elaborate guidelines are set out in Ethical Consideration 5-10:
It is not objectionable for a lawyer who is a potential witness to
be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called as a witness
because his testimony would be merely cumulative or if his testi-
mony will relate only to an uncontested issue. In the exceptional sit-
uation where it will be manifestly unfair to the client for the lawyer
to refuse employment or to withdraw when he will likely be a
witness on a contested issue, he may serve as advocate even though
he may be a witness. In making such decision, he should determine
the personal or financial sacrifice of the client that may result from
his refusal of employment or withdrawal therefrom, the materiality
of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view
of his personal involvement. In weighing these factors, it should be
clear that refusal or withdrawal will impose an unreasonable hard-
ship upon the client before the lawyer accepts or continues the
employment. Where the question arises, doubts should be resolved
in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his becoming or con-
tinuing as an advocate.9
6 Id. at 520.
7 4 J. WiGORE, EVIDENCE § 1911 (1940).
8 CODE, supra note 1. ABA CAIoNs OF PROFESSIONAL ETics Canon 19
(1908): "When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instru-
ment and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counseL Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should
avoid testifying in court on behalf of his client."
9 CODE, supra note 1.
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B. CASE LAW
There is a similarity between case law and the Code regarding
the propriety of the lawyer serving as both counsel and witness in
the probate proceeding. The general rule was stated by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in McCormick v. McCormick:10
It is against sound principles of professional ethics for one who
knows that he is to be called as a witness in a case, to accept the
retainer as lawyer in that case. And where after retainer it is
apparent to an attorney that his testimony will be material in behalf
of his client, it is his duty to confer with his client and associate
counsel at once and finally determine whether he will become a
witness. If it is decided that he shall be a witness, he should im-
mediately sever his connection with the litigation."l
In accord with the Code the courts are hesitant to forbit abso-
lutely serving as both advocate and witness. Courts readily find
that the attorney should not withdraw from conducting the litiga-
tion where it would serve an injustice to the client. 2 This is par-
ticularly true in probate where the attorney's involvement with
the estate is often quite extensive. As the Kentucky Supreme Court
has said: "In our opinion the circumstances surrounding the draft-
ing of a will are of such importance in a will contest case that it is
proper for an attorney who represented the testator to testify con-
cerning this matter even though he represents the testator's es-
tate.,,18
It should be noted that while it is generally improper for a
lawyer to both conduct litigation and testify, if an attorney violates
this rule, he is not incompetent to testify. 4 Further, the client may,
at his own insistance, retain the original counsel in a later stage of
the proceeding.'
l0 150 Neb. 192, 33 N.W.2d 543 (1948). Accord, Protheroe v. Davies, 149
Kan. 720, 89 P.2d 890 (1939) (In this case, the testifying attorney was
the scrivener, an attesting witness, named executor, and served
throughout the lawsuit as attorney for defendants.); In re Estate of
Cunningham, 219 Mm. 80, 17 N.W.2d 85 (1944); Otto Will, 249 Pa.
205, 36 A.2d 797 (1944).
11 150 Neb. at 194, 33 N.W.2d at 545.
12 Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn. 40, 43-44, 124 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1963):
"It is the general rule that a lawyer may not testify in litigation in
which he is an advocate unless circumstances arise which could not
be anticipated and it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
In those rare cases where the testimony of an attorney is needed to
protect his client's interests, it is not only proper but mandatory that
it be forthcoming."
'8 Adams v. Flora, 445 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1969), cited for this proposition
in Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1970).
14 In re Tipton's Estate, 173 Neb. 520, 113 N.W.2d 664 (1962).
15 Id.
PROBATE MATTERS
The issue arises whether it is proper for the law partner to
represent the estate should an attorney be required to be a witness.
In a 1953 case, In re Estate of Benson,16 the Nebraska Supreme
Court held such conduct proper:
We are unable to agree with the reasoning which attaches any
impropriety to the participation of a lawyer as a witness and his
partner as trial counsel in a matter where the partners have repre-
sented the client from the outset and where they are not engaged
upon opposing or conflicting sides of the controversy.17
In contrast, the Code would disqualify the associate. Disciplinary
Rule 5-102(A) provides that "he shall withdraw from conduct of
the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the
trial .... " 18 Since Nebraska has officially adopted the Code, the
status of cases which conflict with the Code, such as Benson, comes
into issue. If the Code has the status of case law (which it appar-
ently does since it has been adopted by the Nebraska Supreme
Court), previous cases in conflict are now overruled.
C. EVALUATiON OF Tm CODE RULEs
The Code provisions in this area are extensive, well-developed
and deserving of strict application by the courts. The Code cor-
rectly stops short of absolutely prohibiting the attorney from both
advocating and witnessing. The separation of roles, however, can
only be corrupted where justice demands it. In all other circum-
stances, logic and reason militate in favor of upholding the separa-
tion.
When the attorney becomes a witness he becomes impeachable
for having an interest in the outcome of the litigation, and the
credibility of his testimony may be lessened. Conversely, the jury
may subconsciously have difficulty separating the witnessing from
the advocating when evaluating testimony. By becoming a witness
the advocate is put in the uncomfortable position of arguing his
own credibility. There is also a basic inconsistency between the
functions of an advocate and a witness. The advocate's function is
to advance his client's cause while the witness's function is to ob-
jectively state the facts. Finally, the impression such a dual role
leaves upon the public mind is injurious to the legal profession.
While the attorney would probably not deliberately distort the
truth in favor of his client, the public might choose to believe he
16 153 Neb. 824, 46 N.W.2d 176 (1953).
17 Id. at 837. 46 N.W.2d at 183.
18 CODE, supra note 1.
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had. It should be emphasized that Canon Nine of the Code provides
that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety."'19
D. WITNESSING AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
A related ethical consideration arises from the various rules and
statutes on privileged communications between the attorney and
his client. In some jurisdictions communications between the
testator and his attorney, except as to the formal requirements of
executing a will, are confidential and inadmissible in the probate
proceeding unless the testator expressly waives the privilege or has
his attorney attest the will. Since the scrivener knows that he will
most likely be appointed counsel to the executor, this rule enables
him to avoid the possibility of being disqualified from probating the
will should his testimony become necessary. As long as he does not
attest the will and the testator does not sign a waiver, the scrivener
is precluded from testifying as to privileged communications and
there is no reason for him to avoid probating the will. Thus, a
premium is placed on not advising the testator to waive privileged
communications. The issue arises whether this is a conflict of in-
terest in violation of Canon Five of the Code. Does the interest of
the scrivener in the possibility of probating the will conflict with
the interest of the testator in having all relevant communications
introduced into the probate proceeding? If this is a conflict of
interest, how should the attorney avoid the conflict? Resolution of
this issue necessitates a closer view of the various rules on privi-
leged communications and a consideration of those principles which
may create an ethical obligation.
Since most courts find some basis for allowing into evidence all
relevant communications between the testator and his attorney, this
ethical problem seldom presents itself. In general, most courts
employ four arguments to find such communications admissible.
One rationale is that while the testator wanted the execution and
contents of his will kept confidential during his lifetime, after his
death the attorney is at liberty to disclose all that is pertinent to
the execution and tenor of the will. 20 As a second basis for admit-
ting privileged communications into evidence the courts reason
that since the executor exercises authority over the interest of the
estate, he can waive the privilege: "It is further generally agreed
that in testamentary contests the privilege is divisible and may be
waived by the executor, the administrator, the heir, the next of kin
or the legatee."21 A third rationale is that the privileged com-
19 CODE, supra note 1.
20 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2314 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
21 Id. § 2329.
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munications statutes frequently apply only to civil actions; since
the probate proceeding is not a civil action, the privileged com-
munications statute does not apply.22 Finally, courts have held that
where the attorney is also an attesting witness the testator is
deemed to have waived the attorney-client privilege.23 Some juris-
dictions, however, have not been as liberal with the admission of
such evidence. One such jurisdiction is Nebraska.
The two definitive cases decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court
on privileged communications are In re Estate of Bayer24 and In re
Estate of Coons.25 In Bayer the testator contacted an attorney and,
after expressing in general terms the disposition of his estate, in-
structed the attorney to draft a will. However, due to delay by
the attorney, the testator had another lawyer draft the instrument.
At trial the contestants sought to have the communication between
the testator and the original attorney introduced into evidence.
The court defined the issue as follows: "[W]here an attorney is
duly employed and counseled with reference to drawing a will
which was never executed, after such employer's death may such
attorney testify to such client's communications thus made while
the relation was in existence? '26
The court held that he could not. Conceding, but not determining,
that § 25-1206 of the Nebraska statutes27 may have codified the com-
mon law rule that "in controversies between heirs at law, devisees
and personal representatives, the claim that the communication was
privileged could not be urged, 2 8 the court found that § 25-120129
modified § 25-1206 so that the attorney's testimony was inadmissible.
Section 25-1201 reads: "The following persons shall be incompetent
to testify: . . .an attorney concerning any communication made to
him by his client in that relation or his advice thereon, without the
client's consent in open court or in writing produced in court."
22 W. PAGE, WILLS § 29.7 (1961). 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2329 (Mc-
Naughton rev. Supp. 1970).
23 3 W. PAGE, WnLs § 29.8 (1961). Note, however, that the waiver is
withdrawn if the testator revokes the will. Lennox v. Anderson, 140
Neb. 748, 1 N.W.2d 912 (1942).
24 116 Neb. 670, 218 N.W. 746 (1928).
25 154 Neb. 690, 48 N.W.2d 778 (1952).
26 116 Neb. at 674-75, 218 N.W. at 748.
27 Then NEB. ComP. STAT. § 8840 (1922): "No practicing attorney ...
shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose any confidential com-
niunication, properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity,
and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the function of
his office according to the usual course of practice or discipline."
28 116 Neb. at 677, 218 N.W. at 749.
29 Then NEB. ComP. STAT. § 8835 (1922).
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Coons relied heavily on the Bayer statutory interpretations and
held that:
[C] ommunications made to an attorney by his client, in the absence
of a proper waiver, [are] inadmissible in a contested probate pro-
ceeding to establish the competency of such client in a contest be-
tween legatees and devisees on the one hand and the legal hears on
the other, even though the will was not drafted by him.30
The court found, however, that the attorney was not precluded
from testifying concerning the legal requirements for executing the
will.
We do not think that the testimony of the attorney who drafted
the will, concerning the formal requirements of its execution, is a
confidential communication within the meaning of section 25-1206,
R. R. S. 1943, or within the prohibition of section 25-1201, R. R. S.
1943. The word "communication" is used to denote the fact that
one person has brought an idea to the perception of another. Testi-
mony of the mechanics followed in executing the will are not within
such definition.3 '
In Coons the witnessing attorney had drafted the will but had not
attested the instrument. The court distinguished other Nebraska
cases which had allowed the attorney to testify.
These are cases where the testator waived the privilege by request-
ing the attorney to attest the will as a subscribing witness. They do
not sustain the right of an attorney who drafted the will of the
testator, in the absence of a waiver, to testify to the mental compe-
tency of the testator at the time of the execution of the will.32
Thus, the Nebraska rule appears to be that "privileged" communica-
tions between the testator and his attorney are inadmissible except
where expressly waived by the testator in accord with § 25-1201 or
impliedly waived in accord with § 25-120733 which arises only when
the attorney has attested the will as a subscribing witness.
As has been mentioned, the Nebraska rule enables the attorney
to avoid disqualifying himself from serving as counsel in the pro-
bate proceeding. As long as the attorney does not attest the will
he is ineligible to testify, and there is no need to refuse employment
30 154 Neb. at 696, 48 N.W.2d at 782.
31 Id. at 697-98, 48 N.W.2d at 782.
32 Id. at 696, 48 N.W.2d at 782. See Brown v. Brown, 77 Neb. 125, 108
N.W. 180 (1906); Lennox v. Anderson, 140 Neb. 748, 1 N.W.2d 912 (1942).
33 "The prohibition of the preceding sections do not apply to cases where
the party in whose favor the respective provisions are enacted, waives
the rights thereby conferred."
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as counsel. Ultimately, then, the attorney is faced with this di-
lemma: Should he advise his client that he be made an attesting
witness to the instrument (or, in the alternative, that the client
sign a written waiver of the client-attorney privilege) and thus
possibly preclude himself from serving as counsel in the probate
proceeding, or should he remain silent as to attestation and thus be
assured that he will not lose the probate because his testimony may
become necessary? Whether this is a conflict of interest in violation
of Canon Five is largely contingent on the interest of the testator
that is served by avoiding the privilege and the exact manner in
which the attorney approaches the dilemma.
The major advantage of allowing the attorney to testify about
communications with the testator, at least as to the validity of the
instrument, is that it promotes the will of the testator. Since a
substantial reason for allowing inheritance is the belief that one
generally has the right to distribute as he desires, the admitting of
all evidence which reflects on that desire is in the interest of the
testator. Even if that evidence tends to show the testator was
"insane" or "unduly influenced," it is in the testator's interest to
have it admitted for if insanity or undue influence is proved, the
instrument would not be a true expression of the testator's desires.
Clearly, the interest of the client that is protected when the attorney
is made a competent witness is strong and surely stronger than any
interest the attorney may have in protecting an opportunity to
probate the will.
It is submitted, therefore, that it is improper for the attorney
to remain silent when the question of who should attest the will
arises. This is not to say, however, that the attorney is under an
absolute duty to insist that the client sign a waiver or have the
attorney attest the will. Where the attorney is practicing in a
jurisdiction with rules similar to Nebraska the attorney should be
under an obligation to fully inform his client that the effect of not
having the attorney attest the will or of not signing a waiver is
that the attorney may be precluded from testifying should a contest
arise. Further, it may be desirable for the attorney to urge his
client to avoid the privilege problem. The extent to which the
attorney is involved with executing the will should also influence
his obligation in this area. Where the attorney is the scrivener of
the will, he should be under a duty both to inform the client of
the privilege problem and to advise him to avoid the potential con-
sequences. However, where the attorney's involvement is only re-
mote, as in the Bayer case, he should only be expected to advise the
testator that communication between them is privileged. In fact,
where the attorney's involvement is as remote as in Bayer there
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is strong justification for the privilege, and it may not be necessary
that the client even be advised of its existence. 34
IV. THE DRAFTING ATTORNEY AS BENEFICIARY
UNDER THE WILL
A. INTRODUCTION
The belief that it is improper for a scrivener to include himself
as a beneficiary of a will dates to ancient Rome. The Emperor
Claudius declared that the writer of a will shall not draft a legacy
to himself.35 While present standards may not be as prohibitive
such practice still evokes the wrath of ethics-conscious courts. Yet
that wrath has not reached such a fervor that precise guidelines
have been forthcoming as to when the attorney can draft himself a
legacy. As the California Supreme Court has remarked: "[T]he
boundary between the ethical and unethical behavior in such cases
is not clearly defined ... ,,36 The following will analyze what guide-
lines have been presented, both in the Code and in the cases, and
also present a proposed rule to guide future conduct.
3 7
B. THE CODE PROVISIONS
The Canons of Professional Ethics, since replaced by the Code,
made no direct mention of the propriety of a lawyer receiving a
gift under a will that he drafted. The courts have traditionally
taken recourse to Canons Eleven and Six in deciding these cases.
34 Bringing the rules on privileged communications in conformance with
other jurisdictions is another way to avoid this conflict of interest. For
an analysis of the Nebraska rules and the available means for chang-
ing them see 31 NEB. L. REV. 111 (1951).
35 DIGEST 48.10.15. As a result of legislation, the Lex Cornelia and an
edict of the Emperor Claudius, it was declared that a legacy to one
who drew the will was invalid. See In re Blake's Will, 21 N.J. 50, 120
A.2d 745 (1956) ; In re Lobb's Will, 177 Ore. 162, 160 P.2d 295 (1945).
36 Magee v. State Bar, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 431, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1962).
37 The attorney-beneficiary problem has been dealt with on two levels:
(1) as a problem of professional responsibility; and (2) as a problem
of undue influence in the will's execution. The breadth of this com-
ment does not include the problem of undue influence. It should be
noted, however, that rules as to one of these levels are not necessarily
applicable to the other. For example, that the taking of a legacy may
be unethical conduct does not affect the issue of undue influence. See
Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 575 (1968). Yet one of the criteria for determin-
ing unethical conduct is whether the drafting attorney exercised
undue influence in obtaining the devise. Magee v. State Bar, 58 Cal.
2d 423, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962); Lantz v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 213,
298 P. 497 (1931).
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Canon Eleven provides that "[t]he lawyer should refrain from
any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by the client. 3 8
Canon Six in turn declares that "it is unprofessional to represent
conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned after
a full disclosure of the facts."3 9 The present Code is more specific
in this area. Ethical Consideration 5-5 reads as follows:
A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to
himself for his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client,
he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge that he unduly influenced
or over-reached the client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a
gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing
so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested advice -from
an independent, competent person who is cognizant of all the cir-
cumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer
should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name
him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the
client.40
While the attorney cannot be accused of impropriety if he insists
that the client select other disinterested counsel to draft a benefiting
will, the issue arises as to what "exceptional circumstances" will
allow the attorney to draft the instrument benefiting himself.
C. CASE LAW
As has been mentioned, case law has left this area of professional
responsibility without precise guidelines. Nevertheless, a search for
some kind of pattern discloses four basic rules proffered by the
various courts: (1) the absolute prohibition rule; (2) the suspicious
practice rule; (3) the modest gift rule; and (4) the intestate devise
rule.
1. The Absolute Prohibition Rule
This rule states that under no circumstances should the attorney
draft a will which names him beneficially. Except for an Oregon
case, In re Jones,4 1 a case which only superficially supports the rule,
38 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 11 (1908). The Ethics
Committee of the American Bar Association in interpreting Canon
Eleven stated that "in cases where the testator desires to name the
lawyer as executor or trustee or to leave him a legacy, the lawyer
should consider having the testator submit the will to another prior
to its execution." H. DRINKER, supra note 2.
39 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL E mcs Canon 6 (1969).
40 CODE, supra note 1 (emphasis added). Canon Five reads: "A lawyer
should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client."
41 254 Ore. 617, 462 P.2d 680 (1969).
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there appears to be no jurisdiction that has officially condemned
such practice as unprofessional in all circumstances.
In Jones the drafting attorney was charged with unethical con-
duct when he, as the sole beneficiary of the testator's estate, failed
to advise the testator to seek independent counsel. In reprimanding
the defendant the court said:
Any lawyer should know, without being told, that when a client
wants to make a testamentary provision for the benefit of the
lawyer, that lawyer should withdraw from any participation in the
preparation or execution of the will. Poor judgment does not ex-
cuse such an inflexible ethical rule.42
On its face, the statement is a powerful prohibition. However,
in deciding that the defendant should not be suspended but only
reprimanded, the court said the drafting attorney "was charged
and found guilty only of failure to insist that his client obtain
independent legal advice."43 Apparently the accused would not
have been guilty of unethical conduct if he had insisted "that his
client obtain independent legal advice." 44
2. The Suspicious Practice Rule
According to this rule, while the attorney may draft a will
which leaves him a legacy such a practice is viewed with a jaun-
diced eye. If such drafting is coupled with improper conduct, it
will be declared an unethical practice. The general principle is
expressed In re Karabatian's Estate.45
In Karabatian the attorney drafted a will for the testator in
which the attorney received a bequest of $10,000 in addition to
being named executor of the estate. Subsequent to the drafting
the testator became displeased with the attorney and had another
scrivener draw a second will which left the first attorney nothing.
In rejecting the attorney's contention that the testator was under
an insane delusion at the time this second will was created, the
court commented adversely on the attorney's having drafted the
first instrument.
[It is] generally recognized by the profession as contrary to the
spirit of its code of ethics for a lawyer to draft a will making
dispositions of property in his favor, and this court has held that
such dispositions are properly looked upon with suspicion.46
42 Id. at 618, 462 P.2d at 680.
43 Id.
44 See infra note 50.
45 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969).
46 Id. at 546, 170 N.W.2d at 169.
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The court reasoned further that since a statute invalidated any
bequest to a witness, public policy also justifies invalidating a be-
quest to a scrivener. Thus, "[i]f an attorney's conduct so violates
the spirit of the lawyer's code of ethics, it also runs contrary to the
public policy of this state. The bequest to contestant being void,
he has no standing to contest the later will.147
Another case which can be considered representative of the
suspicious-practice rule is Nebraska Bar Association v. Richards,48 a
case cited in a footnote to Ethical Consideration 5-5. In Richards
the defendant-attorney drafted several wills for the testarix. In the
last of these wills, besides being named the executor, the defendant
was named the principle beneficiary of the estate. Decedent's estate
was appraised at $86,000, of which the defendant received a cash
bequest of $2,000 and a section of land appraised at $34,000 but
apparently worth about $45,000. The only heirs at law were a
grandniece and a grandnephew. With regard to the propriety of
the attorney drafting himself a legacy the court said:
We do not think respondent was guilty of unethical conduct merely
because he drafted a client's will containing a provision therein
whereby he became a beneficiary of a part of her estate when, as
the record here shows, she insisted he do so .... Attorneys for
clients who wish to leave them or their families a bequest or devise
of part of their property, which they have a perfect right to do, will
do well to have the will drawn by some other lawyer. But if a
client insists on having his or her attorney draft a will containing
such a provision we can see no reason why the attorney should
refuse to do so and thereby defeat his client's wishes.49
Besides drafting the will, the defendant also served as the estate's
attorney in probate. In this latter capacity the defendant sent a
copy of the will to the heirs at law. When he sent the instrument,
however, he merely noted that the will was then in the process of
probation and did not mention that they were the sole heirs at law.
This failure to notify the heirs of their full interest was the cir-
cumstance which, when coupled with the legacy under the will,
made his conduct unprofessional. The defendant had rendered
himself subject to a conflict of interest and had sacrificed the in-
terest of the heirs for his own interest. The court said:
We think the status of respondent required him, when he wrote the
Kertons, to make a full disclosure of all facts within his knowledge
which were material for them to know for the protection of their
interests. His default in this respect, under all of the circumstances
here established, constituted a breach of his trust as an attorney.
47 Id. at 546-47, 170 N.W.2d at 169.
48 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957).
49 Id. at 94-95, 84 N.W.2d at 146.
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... It is apparent he was more concerned in making secure his
rights under the will than he was of performing his duty as an
attorney.50
3. The Modest Gift Rule
By this rule the scrivener is not precluded from receiving a
legacy under a will, provided the legacy is a modest one. Indicative
of the modest gift rule is Magee v. State Bar of California.54 In
Magee the testatrix executed a will that made three $1,000 bequests
to charities, left a neighbor $500 and gave the remainder of the
estate to the defendant, in addition to naming him executor. The
residue of the estate was ultimately valued at $21,000, a value the
defendant claimed he was unaware of when drafting the will. When
the will was executed the scrivener asked an attorney from a
nearby office to attest the instrument. The attorney, upon discover-
ing the bequest, read the will to the testatrix asking whether each
provision was her intent. She responded affirmatively. In evaluat-
ing the defendant's conduct, the court set out the modest gift rule.
There is no rule that attorneys should never draw wills in which
they receive gifts. There is nothing improper in an attorney's draw-
ing wills for his family or for relatives, provided the gift to him is
reasonable under the circumstances. Similarly, there is nothing im-
proper in drawing wills for close friends or for clients if the gift
to the attorney is a modest one .... [H]owever, attorneys take a
grave risk in drawing wills in which they receive more than a
modest gift that is in keeping with the nature of the relationship
they have with the client.52
The gift to the attorney was by no means a modest one. Neverthe-
less, the court refused to find the defendant's conduct improper,
apparently because the attesting lawyer, albeit on his own initiative,
served as a disinterested advisor.
50 Id. at 101, 84 N.W.2d at 149. Insisting that the client seek independent
advice might negate any suspicion which arises by virtue of the
scrivener benefiting from the will. Two Oregon cases, In re Kneeland,
233 Ore. 241, 377 P.2d 861 (1963), and In re Moore, 218 Ore. 403, 345
P.2d 411 (1959), suspended the defendant attorneys from practice for
one year because they failed to advise their clients to seek independent
advice and also because they persuaded their clients to make the
legacies. To the extent that the attorneys were found guilty of un-
ethical conduct with regard to their client's wills, by implication, they
might have been exculpated had they not influenced the testators and
had they insisted independent advice be sought. In re Jones, 254 Ore.
617, 462 P.2d 680 (1969), distinguished these two cases. Jones held
the defendant should only be reprimanded because he had not influ-
enced the testator but was only guilty of failing to insist his client
seek independent advice.
51 58 Cal. 2d 423, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962).
52 Id. at 433, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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4. The Intestate Devise Rule
According to this rule the drafting attorney can take by the will
only what he could take by intestacy. A Wisconsin case, State v.
Collentine,5 is representative of the intestate devise rule. The
testatrix in Collentine requested the defendant attorney to draft a
will in which he was to be named both executor and sole benefi-
ciary. Since the testatrix was in debt, the defendant knew that he
would receive nothing under the will. Nevertheless, the defendant
advised her to have other counsel draft the instrument. The testa-
trix, being a person who "wanted to prove she had control over
anybody she was dealing with,"54 prevailed over the defendant's
objections, and he drafted the will. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
in censoring the defendant for unprofessional conduct, held:
[A] lawyer may be the scrivener of a will in which he is a bene-
ficiary only when he stands in relationship to the testator as the
natural object of the testator's bounty and where under the will he
received no more than would be received by law in the absence of
a will. 5
The court concluded:
When a testator wishes to have his attorney draft a will in which
the attorney is entitled to anything more than he would be at law,
it is the absolute duty of the attorney to refuse to act. He has the
responsibility of advising his client to consult another attorney if
he wishes to pursue such a bequest.5 6
D. A SUGGESTED RULE
It is suggested that the following rule be adopted as a guideline
for evaluating the propriety of a scrivener drafting himself a
legacy: Except where circumstances do not allow the testator to
seek other counsel, the lawyer is absolutely precluded from drafting
a will in which he is named a beneficiary.57
53 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
54 Id. at 329, 159 N.W.2d at 52.
55 Id. at 332, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
56 Id. at 332-33, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
57 This is not to say that the court should punish a scrivener who drafts
a benefiting will in conformance with some previous judicial decision
of his jurisdiction. Such punishment would, without some kind of
notice, constitute unfair surprise. The rule proposed should be brought
about by either an interpretation of Ethical Consideration 5-5 to be
applied prospectively or by amending the Code.
If the attorney should decide he is justified in drafting a benefiting
will, he would do well to follow this advice from Dengler Estate, 13
Pa. D. & C.2d 193, 201-02 (Phila. Co. O.C. 1958): "Failing that [having
another attorney draft the will), the interested scrivener should be
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Allowing attorneys to draft benefiting wills has certain advan-
tages. The foremost is that it follows the desires of the testator,
and the personal fancy of the individual testator is a dominant
theme in the law of wills. In addition, it enables attorneys to draft
wills for close friends and relatives. Trying to explain to a friend
or relative why he cannot draft a benefiting will may cause the
attorney some difficulty and may even produce hard feelings. More-
over, if a friend or relative of the attorney takes his will to other
counsel, the impression may arise that the attorney is so incompe-
tent that his own friends and relatives do not trust his work.
Granting these advantages, there remain so many potential
ethical problems in allowing the scrivener to benefit under the will
that the practice should be prohibited. Not the least of these poten-
tial problems is a possible conflict of interest. Canon Five of the
Code provides that "[a] lawyer should exercise independent pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of a client."' 8 When the attorney
drafts a will he stands in a fiduciary relationship with his client. A
fiduciary relationship obligates the attorney to insure that his own
interest does not clash with that of the testator. The ability of the
drafting attorney to live up to this obligation becomes particularly
difficult when he obtains a vested interest in a will he has drawn.
One area in which this potential clash may manifest itself is where
the attorney is requested to testify concerning the will. The at-
torney may be forced to choose between renouncing his legacy to
testify or not testifying with the hope that the will may neverthe-
less be upheld. Such a problem arose in State v. Horan"9 where the
drafting attorney avoided the choice by stipulation. The Wisconsin
court found that it could not "say the stipulation absolves Horan
from creating, in part, the situation which was resolved by the
stipulation."6 0
absolutely certain that testatrix has the knowledge and memory with
regard to the classic requisites for making a will, viz., the extent of
her assets, the identity of her relatives and those relatives who are
the natural objects of her benefactions. This is particularly important
where the testatrix is mentally incapacitated."
58 CODE, supra note 1.
59 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963). State v. Horan involved a
defendant who drafted six wills for the testator. In each succeeding
will the defendant's share of the estate increased as other beneficiaries
were either eliminated or had their share reduced. Ultimately, under
the fifth will (the sixth will being excluded from probate) the de-
fendant received a legacy and residuary share totalling $38,817.22 in
an estate of approximately $265,000. Horan is limited by State v. Col-
lentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
60 21 Wis. 2d at 73-74, 123 N.W.2d at 491.
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Another area in which a conflict of interest may arise is with
regard to the continuing relationship between a scrivener and his
client. 1 The attorney is obligated to inform his client of any
change in the law or facts which may affect his client's will. When
the attorney is beneficiary under the instrument his willingness
to inform his client of a change which might adversely affect that
interest may be circumscribed.
Even where the drafting attorney is especially careful to avoid
a conflict of interest, his taking a legacy nevertheless creates an
appearance of impropriety. This is a violation of Canon Nine. 2 It
is almost inevitable that both the public and the press will interpret
such a legacy as the product of undue influence. Such adverse
publicity brings discredit to both the drafting attorney and the legal
profession.
Finally, a gift to the scrivener places the will itself in jeopardy.
By creating a possible charge of undue influence the attorney in-
vites a will contest where the instrument might have otherwise
gone uncontested. And where there is no rule of partial invalidity
the scrivener may be causing harm to other beneficiaries.
The exception that the attorney should be allowed to draft a
benefiting will if the testator would be unable to seek other counsel
is based on the notion that the advantage of having a will outweighs
the possible appearance of undue influence. Of course, circum-
stances under which the testator would be unable to seek other
counsel are rare.
61 The duty of the drafting attorney toward his client does not end with
the signing of the will. Often events transpire after execution of the
will which significantly alter the complexion of that instrument.
Changes in legislation, important court decisions, the moving of the
testator to another jurisdiction where different laws of descent are in
force, changes in economic conditions, and kindred matters may cause
the instrument to be markedly different than the one the testator
originally intended. Cognizant of such possibilities, the American Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances has
said: "It is our opinion that where the lawyer has no reason to
believe that he has been supplanted by another lawyer, it is not only
his right, but it may even be his duty to advise his client of any
change of fact or law which might defeat the client's testamentary
purpose as expressed in the will." ABA Comm. oN PROFESSIONAL
ETHrcs, OpIONS, No. 210 (1941).
62 CoDE, supra note 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
One of the greatest obligations of the attorney to both himself
and his profession is to be on a constant guard against creating even
the appearance of impropriety. In probate this obligation becomes
particularly acute. Because death is the necessary fate of everyone,
probate is especially subject to public scrutiny. Aware of the
strong need for confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,
this comment has proposed the following. First, the probate attorney
must avoid the appearance that he is conspiring with commercial
institutions to the detriment of his client. Second, the probate at-
torney must avoid combining witnessing and advocating and thus
the possible appearance that he has sacrificed truth for expediency.
And finally, the attorney must refrain from drafting benefiting wills
and the possible appearance of having unduly influenced his client.
William L. Killion '73
